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CRIMINAL LAW - SELF-INCRIMINATION - COMPULSORY
MENTAL EXAMINATION
State v. Raskin, 150 N.W.2d 318 (Wis. 1967).
One of the most troublesome areas of criminal law today in-
volves the determination of criminal responsibility when a defend-
ant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity. At least 30 States, the
District of Columbia, and the federal government have attempted
to alleviate some of the problems in this area by enacting legisla-
tion requiring a defendant who pleads insanity to submit to a men-
tal examination.' The main purpose of such a statute is to assure
the court of an unbiased and competant evaluation of the defend-
ant's mental condition. This purpose grew out of the realization
that much of the medical testimony offered by both sides in such
cases has been highly unreliable and prejudicial.2
The compulsory mental examination statutes, however, present
new problems and their usefulness must be considered in light of
the ability of the courts to solve these problems without thwarting
the purpose for which the statutes were enacted. The most impor-
tant problem to be resolved is the clash between the compulsory
mental examination and the privilege against self-incrimination.
To what extent should the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination protect a defendant in the statutory examination?
And, to what extent, if any, is the privilege waived if a defendant
voluntarily submits to the examination? The Supreme Court has
made the finding of answers to these questions obligatory on the
States by incorporating the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination into the due process clause of the 14th amendment.3
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in the recent case of State v.
Raskin,4 has attempted to formulate an answer to the problem?
In Wisconsin when a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of in-
I For a list of the jurisdictions which have enacted such legislation, see Danforth,
Death Knell for Pre-Trial Mental Examinations? Privilege Against Self-Incrimination.
19 RUTGERS L. REV. 489 (1965). See also Note, Pretrial Mental Examinations in
Maine: Are They Mechanisms for Compelling Self-Incrimination?, 18 ME. L. REV. 96,
97 (1966); Comment, Compulsory Mental Examinations and the Privilege Against
Selt-Incrimination, 1964 Wis. L. REV. 671.
2 Jessner v. State, 202 Wis. 184, 186-87, 231 N.W. 634, 636 (1930); Comment,
supra note 1, at 674.
3 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
4 150 N.W.2d 318 (1967).
5 The Wisconsin Supreme Court had previously upheld the constitutionality of the
compulsory mental examination. Jessner v. State, 202 Wis. 184, 231 N.W. 634 (1930).
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sanity the court may "appoint one or more disinterested qualified
experts to testify at the trial."6  A defendant had been convicted of
the crimes of robbery, arson, and burglary on his pleas of not guilty
and not guilty by reason of insanity. These convictions were re-
versed and remanded by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.' Upon re-
mand, the trial court, pursuant to the Wisconsin compulsory mental
examination statute, appointed two psychiatrists to examine the de-
fendant on his plea of insanity. The psychiatrists attempted to ex-
amine the defendant, Shoffner, but, upon the advice of counsel, he
refused to answer many of the questions asked and invoked his priv-
ilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Shoffner then made a
motion to have the issue of his guilt determined before the issue of
his insanity, and to have the proof presented in a sequential manner
so that the jury would not be informed of the special plea of insan-
ity. He requested that no psychiatric testimony be taken until a
verdict of guilty was returned on the issue of guilt. The trial court
granted the motion for a sequential order of proof in a continuous
trial.' The State of Wisconsin then promptly brought an action
for a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court from proceeding
in this manner. The supreme court stated that:
[Wjhen the accused who was subjected to a compulsory mental
examination can show a disclosure of the inculpatory statements,
admissions or confessions in response to questions of the examin-
ing doctor, he is entitled to ask for a sequential order of proof on
the issues of guilt and insanity in order to assure himself of his
constitutional rights of a fair trial, and such compulsory statements
and confessions can only be used on the issue of insanity and not
in any way upon the issue of guilt.9
The court also ordered Shoffner to submit to the examination, stat-
ing that he could reapply to the trial court for a sequential order of
proof should grounds therefore appear in the record.1"
The Wisconsin court, in reaching this decision, emphasized the
importance of a complete, unbiased mental examination without
constitutional restriction.
We think this section [WIs. STAT. ANN. § 957.27(1) (1958)1
should be construed to require a mental examination which is ef-
ficient and complete and not limited by constitutional restrictions
or dependent upon the waiver of the accused's constitutional right
0WIn. STAT. ANN. § 957.27(1) (1958).
7 State v. Shoffner, 31 Wis. 2d 412, 143 N.W.2d 458 (1966).
8 State v. Raskin, 150 N.W.2d 318, 328 (1967).
0 d.
1O1d. at 328-29.
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not to give incriminating answers during the examination. There
is no reason why a compulsory mental examination should be re-
stricted and its purpose impaired if the constitutional rights of the
accused can be protected by restrictions in the use of the exam-
ination. 1
The Raskin court, in effect, said that there is no difficulty in
reconciling the fifth amendment right with the right to a full and
fair trial on the issue of criminal responsibility, because the court
can, through no great procedural difficulty, avoid the problem alto-
gether by completely separating the issues of guilt and insanity."2
The constitutionality of Wisconsin's compulsory mental exam-
ination statute was upheld earlier in Jessner v. State.'" The de-
fendant in that case underwent the compulsory mental examination
without complaint, but on appeal claimed that the effect of the
statute was to provide the prosecution with evidence for use at the
trial.'4 The prosecution used the argument, accepted by a majority
of the courts that have considered this problem," that the defendant
must waive, to the extent necessary, the personal privilege against
self-incrimination in regard to the compulsory mental examination
when he voluntarily pleads not guilty by reason of insanity."
This quid pro quo argument assumes that making a plea of not
guilty by reason of insanity is a privilege and not a right. The pur-
pose of allowing a plea of insanity is to permit the accused to show
that he lacked the requisite intent to commit the crime.' Clearly,
the 14th amendment due process clause which gives the right to
confront witnesses, the right not to have comments made on a de-
fendant's failure to testify, et cetera, also demands that a defendant
"1 d. at 324.
12 The court even admitted that the Wisconsin Legislature intended that the issues
of guilt and insanity were to be tried concurrently, but it noted that the Wisconsin jury
instruction directed the jurors that the not guilty plea was to be determined first and the
insanity issue second. Id. The State argued that a statute, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 957.11
(1958), prohibited a sequential order of proof; the court dismissed this issue summarily.
150 N.W.2d at 324.
13202 Wis. 184, 231 N.W. 634 (1930).
14Id. at 186, 231 N.W. at 636.
15 E.g., Hall v. State, 209 Ark. 180, 189 S.W.2d 917 (1945); People v. Ditson, 57
Cal.2d 415, 369 P.2d 714, 20 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1962); State v. Swinburne, 324 S.W.2d
746 (Mo. 1959); People v. Esposito, 387 N.Y. 389, 39 N.E.2d 925 (1942); Common-
wealth v. Butler, 405 Pa. 36, 173 A.2d 468, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 945 (1961). Contra,
State v. Hathaway, 161 Me. 255, 211 A.2d 558 (1965).
16 See H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 295 (1954);
21 AM. Jul. 2D Criminal Law § 365 (1965).
17 See Danforth, supra note 1, at 501; Note, supra note 1, at 100.
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have the right to plead and prove a lack of criminal intent.' It is
certainly a right rather than a privilege for the defendant to show
that he was not responsible for the act committed. Thus, the de-
fendant who voluntarily submits to the compulsory examination,
seeking to exercise his right to establish his lack of intent, is denied
the fifth amendment privilege guaranteed by the Constitution.
The accused has another alternative, however, if he wishes to be
guaranteed the privilege of the fifth amendment. He can refuse to
submit to the compulsory examination or refuse to answer questions
during the examination which would tend to incriminate him. The
courts have generally held that an accused who refuses to take the
compulsory mental examination cannot be forced to submit. 9 One
court went even further and held that the trial court cannot penalize
a defendant who refuses the mental examination by denying him
the right to plead insanity.20 For a mental examination to be use-
ful it must be complete and penetrating or the psychiatrist will be
unable to come to any valid conclusions." The defendant who
chooses this alternative is denied a full and complete examination,
thereby damaging his chances of proving his lack of guilt by reason
of his insanity.
Thus, according to the present legal interpretation, the accused
who desires to exercise his right to show a lack of intent, and con-
sequently a lack of guilt, must either sacrifice his right against self-
incrimination or severely restrict any attempt to fully evaluate his
mental responsibility. In Malloy v. Hogan,2 where the Supreme
Court announced that the fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination was incorporated into the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, the Court indicated the scope of the right,
stating that it is the "right of a person to remain silent unless he
chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to
suffer no penalty... for such silence."2" Malloy v. Hogan was fol-
18 Cf. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965).
1921 AM. JuR. 2D Criminal Law § 365 (1965); see People v. Combes, 56 Cal. 2d
135, 363 P.2d 4, 14 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1961); French v. District Court, 153 Colo. 10, 384
P.2d 268 (1963); State v. Myers, 220 S.C. 309, 67 S.E.2d 506 (1951).
20 French v. District Court, 153 Colo. 10, 384 P.2d 268 (1963).
21 H. WEiHOFEN, supra note 16, at 297; Salzman, Psychiatric Interviews as Evi-
dence: The Role of the Psychiatrist in Court - Some Suggestions and Case Histories,
30 GEO. WASu. L. REv. 853, 855-56 (1963).
22 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
23 Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
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lowed by Griffin v. California4 which further defined the "penalty"
concept of Malloy. The Court said the "penalty" was not limited
to a fine or imprisonment, but that a violation of the fifth amend-
ment would take place if the assertion of the right were "costly". 5
The Court in Griffin considered the prejudice created by the pros-
ecution's comment to the jury on the defendant's failure to take the
witness stand to be a "costly" consequence of exercising the right."
It would seem clear that it is "costly" when it prejudices the right
of a defendant to plead insanity as a defense, when admissions he
makes in trying to prove his insanity are later used to establish his
guilt, or alternatively that it is prejudicially "costly" for a defendant
to be denied the full and complete right of proving his insanity be-
cause he desires the protection of his right against self-incrimination.
This becomes more evident in light of Spevack v. Klein27 in which
the Court held that disbarment from the legal profession (member-
ship in which is a privilege, not a right) was a "costly" result of a
defendant's exercise of his right against self-incrimination."
State v. Raskin attempted to relieve the defendant who pleads
not guilty by reason of insanity of the "costly" choice between two
unsatisfactory alternatives. The solution proposed by the Wiscon-
sin court allows the defendant to participate completely and fully
in the mental examination, free from the fear that what he divulges
might later be used against him. Raskin enables the State to ob-
tain a fair evaluation of the defendant's mental condition, thereby
fulfilling the purpose for the compulsory mental examination stat-
ute."9 The solution chosen by the court, however, is not the best
one which has been formulated to solve the problems in this area.
Under the Raskin decision, the same jury would decide the is-
sues of guilt and insanity in contiguous trials. The Wisconsin con-
stitution guarantees every defendant the right to a trial by an im-
partial jury."0 It is questionable whether a jury which has decided
the issue of guilt may then make an impartial evaluation of a de-
fendant's criminal responsibility.
A solution which has all the advantages of the Raskin decision,
and which also provides an impartial jury, is the split trial procedure
24 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
25 Id. at 614; see Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967).
26 380 U.S. at 609.
27 385 U.S. 511 (1967). See generally 18 W. RES, L. REV. 1348 (1967).
28385 U.S. at 516.
29 See authorities cited note 2 supra.
80 Wis. CoNsT. arL I, § 7.
